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The Writing’s on the Wall: The Intent Requirement
in Louisiana Destination Law
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, neighbors are a pain. Overhanging tree branches,
unmowed lawns, or loud dogs could get under anyone’s skin.
However, neighbors sometimes go too far. Imagine that your
house’s water supply is piped in from a reservoir on your
neighbor’s property. The pipe connecting your house to the
reservoir is above ground. Some time ago, both your lot and your
neighbor’s lot belonged to a single, “common” owner. In preparing
to sell both lots, the common owner built the reservoir and pipe.
When he sold the properties, however, the common owner
neglected to say anything about the arrangement. Years later, your
neighbor decides that he is sick of looking at the reservoir and
decides that it is time to tear it down. When you complain, he
points out that you and he never contracted to maintain the
situation. Infuriated, you seek a court order trying to stop him from
destroying your access to the reservoir.
If this scenario occurred in any state but Louisiana, you might
be out of luck. Many common law jurisdictions have refused to
recognize “easements by implication”—burdens on an estate
created without an express grant such as the pipeline situation
described above—except in a few narrow circumstances.1 If the
above hypothetical occurred in Louisiana, however, you would
probably have a valid claim. The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes
that, in some scenarios, an estate can be burdened without the
agreement of the owners.2 One of these methods, taken directly
from the French Civil Code, is known as “destination of the
owner.”3 Destination of the owner can arise in two ways: (1) The
owner of an estate creates a burden, or “charge,” in favor of one
Copyright 2013, by MARSHALL L. PERKINS. This Comment relies on
numerous sources in the original French. Unless otherwise indicated, all
translations are by the author.
1. See, e.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698 (Kan. 1938) (reasoning that
an easement by implication by prior use is difficult to justify when the implied
benefit is being claimed by the grantor); Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.
1950) (stating that Texas courts only recognize easements by implication by
strict necessity). See also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 21 (2011). An in-depth
discussion of common-law easements by implication is outside the scope of this
Comment, which is solely concerned with Louisiana property law.
2. See discussion infra Part I.A.
3. Destination is based on the French Civil Code regime of destination du
père de famille or “destination of the father of the family.” See discussion infra
Part I.C–D.
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portion of the estate, then later transfers ownership of one or both
portions; or (2) the common owner of two estates creates a charge
on one in favor of the other, then later transfers ownership of one
or both estates.4 Under Louisiana Civil Code article 741, once the
estates cease to belong to the same owner, a predial servitude—the
civilian counterpart of an easement5—comes into existence unless
the parties expressly agree otherwise.6
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that a party
who asserts that a predial servitude was created by destination must
prove the “intent” of the common owner to create the servitude.7
According to the court, evidence of the common owner’s intent
consists of exterior signs of the servitude at the time common
ownership ceases.8 The supreme court based its reasoning on the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s earlier application of
this intent requirement.9
This Comment argues that the subjective intent requirement is
highly questionable and should be abandoned in favor of a more
objective standard. Because destination issues arise only in the
absence of an agreement between the parties, destination implies a
fictional agreement between them.10 Because no actual agreement
exists between the parties, the question is whether the parties should
have reasonably believed that a servitude would be created.11 This
determination is based upon the obvious signs of a burden on one of
the estates in favor of the other.12 That objective inquiry efficiently
resolves destination disputes by simply determining whether the
situation was apparent, or “perceivable by exterior works, signs, or
4. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and
Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L. REV. 57, 77 (1982).
5. Rose v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 508 F.3d 773, 776–77 (5th Cir. 2007).
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011). Article 741 provides:
Destination of the owner is a relationship established between two
estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude
if the estates belonged to different owners.
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, unless
there is express provision to the contrary, an apparent servitude
comes into existence of right and a nonapparent servitude comes
into existence if the owner has previously filed for registry in the
conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located
a formal declaration establishing the destination.
Id.
7. Phipps v. Schupp, 45 So. 3d 593, 598–602 (La. 2010).
8. Id.
9. See id.; see also discussion infra Part I.C.
10. See discussion infra Part III.B.
11. See Lee Hargrave, Property—Review of Recent Developments: 1991–
1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 953, 960 (1993).
12. Id.
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constructions.”13 A requirement that a party provide evidence of the
common owner’s subjective intent invites inefficiency and
uncertainty into this area of the law and should therefore be
eliminated.14
Accordingly, this Comment analyzes the reasoning behind the
jurisprudential intent requirement. Part I provides the relevant codal
and historical background of destination. Part II discusses how the
intent requirement entered into the jurisprudential application of
article 741. Part III analyzes the relevant French doctrine on the
issue. Part IV examines the conceptual and practical difficulties that
the intent requirement presents and concludes that courts should take
an objective approach in applying article 741. The approach should
be framed in terms of a tacit agreement between the parties to
continue the relationship that existed at the time that the estates
ceased to belong to the same owner. If there is any element of
subjective intent in a destination case, it is only a bilateral tacit
intention between the parties at the moment ownership is severed.
I. BACKGROUND
The following discussion defines predial servitudes and explains
how they are created under the civilian idea of “destination of the
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 707 (2011).
14. Destination claims arise more often than the reader might think. See,
e.g., Huy Tuyet Tran v. Misuraca, No. 2010 CA 2183, 2011 WL 2617382 (La.
Ct. App. 1st May 6, 2011) (holding that a servitude of passage was created by
destination of the owner); Davis v. Provost, 980 So. 2d 821, 826 (La. Ct. App.
3d 2008) (discussing creation of servitudes by destination); Trunk v. Berg, 866
So. 2d 922, 928 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004) (refusing to apply article 741
retroactively); W.L. Wagner v. Fairway Villas Condominium Assocs., Inc., 813
So. 2d 512, 517 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002) (holding that because underground pipes
were nonapparent, no servitude of aqueduct was created under article 741);
Jackson v. Jackson, 818 So. 2d 192, 197–98 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2002) (concluding
that an apparent servitude of drain was created the moment that the property was
partitioned); Griffith v. Cathey, 762 So. 2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002) (holding
that because plaintiff never owned defendants property, no servitude could be
created by destination); Comby v. White, 737 So. 2d 94, 96–97 (La. Ct. App. 3d
1999) (finding that utility lines constituted evidence of apparent servitude
existing at severance of ownership); McCann v. Normand, 696 So. 2d 203, 206–
07 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1997) (holding that because article 741 is a substantive law,
it cannot be applied retroactively); Williams v. Wiggins, 641 So. 2d 1068, 1073
(La. Ct. App. 2d 1994) (noting that the servitude must be created by an owner,
not a lessee, for destination to apply); Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Kirby Exploration
Co. of Tex., 909 F.2d 811, 814–15 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a pipeline
servitude would have been created by destination if Louisiana law had applied);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Badine, No. 93-4065, 1994 WL 577482 (E.D. La. Oct. 17,
1994) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether common owner
intended to create a servitude of passage).
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owner.” The discussion then addresses the French roots of
destination and how Louisiana law on the issue has evolved.
A. Predial Servitudes: Definition, Nature, and Distinctions
The Louisiana Civil Code defines a predial servitude as “a
charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate.”15
Examples of predial servitudes include rights of drain, view, light,
passage, drawing water, aqueduct, and pasturage.16 A fundamental
tenet of predial servitudes is that in order for one to exist, the
dominant and servient estates must belong to different owners.17
Furthermore, a benefit to the dominant estate is essential.18
Without a benefit to the dominant estate, the servitude is merely a
personal, or “credit,” right in favor of the estate’s owner.19
There are three types of predial servitudes: natural, legal, and
conventional.20 Natural servitudes owe their existence to the
natural situation of estates, such as a servitude of drainage when an
estate is situated above another.21 Legal servitudes, as the name
suggests, are established by law for the benefit of the general
public or the benefit of particular persons.22 Examples of legal
servitudes include the obligation to keep a building in repair,23 the
prohibition of projecting over a boundary,24 and the prohibition of
making an opening in a common wall.25 Lastly, voluntary, or
“conventional,” predial servitudes are established by juridical act,
acquisitive prescription, or destination of the owner.26 This
Comment concerns only conventional predial servitudes.
A key distinction, particularly for the purposes of this Comment,
lies in the classification of a predial servitude as either apparent or
nonapparent. Apparent servitudes are “perceivable by exterior signs,
works, or constructions; such as a roadway, a window in a common
wall, or an aqueduct.”27 Nonapparent servitudes, on the other hand,
15.
16.
17.
res sua
cmt. f.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 646.
Id. art. 699.
Id. art. 646. This provision is an application of the Roman maxim nemini
servit (no one has a right of servitude in his own property). Id. art. 646
Id. art. 647.
See id. art. 647 cmt. c.
Id. art. 654.
Id. art. 655.
Id. art. 659.
Id. art. 660.
Id. art. 663.
Id. art. 681.
Id. art. 654.
Id. art. 707.
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have no exterior signs of their existence.28 Examples of nonapparent
servitudes include the prohibition of building on an estate or the
prohibition of building above a certain height.29 Apparent servitudes
may be acquired by title, acquisitive prescription, or destination.30
Title means an act translative of ownership, such as a contract of
sale.31 Title also contemplates a testament or partition.32 Unlike
apparent servitudes, nonapparent servitudes can be acquired only by
title.33 However, this rule is subject to one, distinct exception: If a
common owner has previously filed a formal declaration of
destination, then a nonapparent servitude may be acquired by
destination of the owner if there is no express agreement otherwise
between the parties.34
B. Destination of the Owner—Article 741
Most conventional and apparent predial servitudes are acquired
by title.35 However, Louisiana law recognizes that conventional
and apparent servitudes can be acquired without title in two ways:
by acquisitive prescription or by destination of the owner.36
Louisiana Civil Code article 741 defines destination as follows:
Destination of the owner is a relationship established between
two estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial
servitude if the estates belonged to different owners.
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner,
unless there is express provision to the contrary, an apparent
servitude comes into existence of right and a nonapparent
servitude comes into existence if the owner has previously
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in
which the immovable is located a formal declaration
establishing the destination.37
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 740.
31. See id. art. 3483 cmt. b.
32. Id.
33. Id. art. 739.
34. See id. art. 741. A “formal declaration of destination” simply means a title
filed in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located.
Id.; id. art. 739.
35. See id. art. 722 cmt. b. Predial servitudes may be created in any manner
that immovables may be transferred. Id.
36. Id. arts. 740, 741. Acquisitive prescription is not discussed in this Comment.
37. Id. art. 741. Current article 741 was revised in 1977 as part of the
Louisiana Legislature’s extensive revision of the Code articles on predial
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A predial servitude cannot be created under article 741 unless
the two estates belonged to the same owner and the common
owner established the relationship giving rise to the servitude.38
The “relationship established between two estates that would be a
predial servitude” can arise in two distinct scenarios: (1) The
owner of a single estate creates a charge in favor of one portion of
the estate, then later transfers ownership of one or both portions; or
(2) the common owner of two estates creates a charge on the
servient estate in favor of the dominant estate, then later transfers
ownership of one or both estates.39 Article 741 expressly states that
at the moment the dominant and servient estates cease to belong to
the same person, an apparent predial servitude “comes into
existence of right” unless there is a clear agreement otherwise.40
Thus, even though there is no title regarding the servitude, the law
nonetheless deems a conventional predial servitude to exist.41
C. Destination’s French Origins
The creation of predial servitudes by destination is a uniquely
French civilian institution.42 The French refer to destination as la
destination du père de famille (the destination of the father of the
family).43 The provisions of the French Civil Code were drawn

servitudes. See 1977 La. Acts 1309, 1335. Article 741 is based on a combination
of articles 649, 767, 768, and 769 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Id. art. 741
cmt. a. The effects of the revision are discussed infra in Part I.D.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b.
39. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 77.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741.
41. It is somewhat odd that the Civil Code’s destination provision is found
in the title covering conventional predial servitudes because destination is a
suppletive legal rule, which is relevant only in the absence of an agreement. Id.
If the law supplies the “agreement” between the parties that creates the
servitude, destination should be characterized as a legal servitude, which, by
definition, is “imposed by law.” Id. art. 654. Therefore, destination is arguably in
the wrong part of the Code.
42. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 74 (noting that the historical basis
for destination is grounded in the custom of Paris); 2 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL.,
LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL § 1721, at 408 (7th ed. 1989) (stating that “[destination]
is a mode of acquisition of servitudes unknown to Roman law”); JEAN-LOUIS
BERGEL, MARC BRUSCHI & SYLVIE CIMAMONTI, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL—LES
BIENS § 343, at 344 (1st ed. 1999) (arguing that French customary law on
destination differed by region but was consolidated in the first redaction of the
Custom of Paris).
43. Although the French use a different term than the one used in Louisiana,
it is well settled that “father of the family” simply refers to the previous common
owner of the two estates. See, e.g., PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES BIENS § 155, at 212
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from the Custom of Paris, an early redaction of regional French
customary law.44
French doctrine differs as to the reasoning behind the
institution of destination.45 Some writers believe that for destination
to apply, the common owner must intend to create a predial
servitude and that such intent must be evidenced with exterior
signs.46 Although several French writers accept this basis for
destination, others are not so convinced.47 For example, some
writers reject the intent idea altogether as conceptually impossible,48
while others consider the common owner’s intent to be important
only in instances where the extent of a predial servitude is at issue.49
Despite their differing opinions on destination, most French
writers—in one way or another—agree that destination is based on
the idea of a “tacit convention” between the parties that the
existing state of affairs will be maintained.50 In other words, “tacit
convention” or “tacit agreement” theory provides that the owners
of two estates, at the moment that unitary ownership ceases,

(1995) (“Destination of the father of the family is a particular arrangement
between estates established by the common owner of them . . . .”); 5 GABRIEL
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & EMILE CHAUVEAU, TRAITÉ THEÓRIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL § 1115, at 845 (2d ed. 1899) (“[T]he situation established by the
father of the family, meaning the owner of the two immovables . . . .”); 2
VICTOR MARCADÉ, EXPLICATION THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL §
694, at 642 (8th ed. 1886) (“[D]estination of the pater familias, meaning the
owner of the estates . . . .”).
44. 3 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 966, at 946 n.3 (2d ed. 1952) (noting that the formula for the
French Civil Code articles on destination is found in the Custom of Paris, apart
from the Custom’s writing requirement); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILLIPE SIMLER,
DROIT CIVIL—LES BIENS § 830, at 677 n.2 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that
destination’s original foundation is the Custom of Paris).
45. Compare PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, §§ 966, 968, at 946–48
(asserting that the common owner must intend to create a servitude and that such
intent must be evidenced by exterior signs), with BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE &
CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 846 (arguing that the creation of predial
servitudes by destination of the owner is founded only on a “tacit convention”
between subsequent owners that the former owner’s state of affairs would
remain in place).
46. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–4.
47. See discussion infra Part III.B.1–3.
48. 8 FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 172, at
204 (2d ed. 1876).
49. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845
n.1.
50. See, e.g., PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946; BAUDRYLACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 844–45; MAZEAUD ET
AL., supra note 42, § 1721, at 410.
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implicitly agree that an apparent predial servitude will be created.51
Under tacit agreement theory, one simply looks to whether an
apparent burden existed between two estates at the moment that
they ceased to be owned by the same person.52 In that case, the
parties will be deemed by law to have tacitly agreed that the
situation will continue to remain in effect.53 The tacit agreement
thus serves as a form of unwritten title to a conventional predial
servitude.54
D. Evolution of Louisiana’s Destination Regime
The Louisiana Legislature extensively revised the Code articles
governing predial servitudes in 1977.55 Current Civil Code article
741 is based on a combination of articles 649, 767, 768, and 769 of
the Civil Code of 1870.56 Until the 1977 revision, Louisiana’s
articles on destination were translations of the counterpart articles
in the Napoleonic Code, which remain in effect in France.57
Article 767 of the 1870 Code equated destination to title with
respect to continuous and apparent servitudes.58 Although article
51. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
52. 3 CHARLES AUBRY & FRÉDÉRIC CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANÇAIS § 252, at 118 (6th ed. 1938).
53. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 203–04.
54. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946.
55. 1977 La. Acts 1309.
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. a (2011). Article 649 of the Code of 1870
simply referenced the other articles and will not be discussed here. See 2008
COMPILED EDITION OF CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 640–42 (A. N. Yiannopoulos
ed., 2008) [hereinafter 2008 COMPILED CODES]. Article 769 of the 1870 Code
was a translation of article 694 of the Code Napoleon. Id. It was adopted in the
second operative paragraph of current article 741. Id. However, article 741
differs because it now allows both apparent and nonapparent servitudes to be
created by destination. Id. Furthermore, article 741 now simply states that an
apparent servitude “comes into existence of right” unless there is an express
provision otherwise. Id.
57. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640–42; see also CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 692–694 (Fr.).
58. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640. The 1977 revision did away
with the distinction between continuous and discontinuous servitudes.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 75. Continuous servitudes were “those whose use
may be continual, with or without the act of man,” such as the rights of aqueduct,
view, and drain. Acadiana-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d
856, 859 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1965). Discontinuous servitudes required an act of man to
be used, such as a right of passage or drawing water. Id. In Louisiana, both
continuous and discontinuous servitudes may now be created by destination.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 75. In France, the distinction remains relevant
because only continuous servitudes may be created by destination. C. CIV. art. 692
(Fr.).
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767 did not mention intent, its source provisions in the Louisiana
Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825 did.59 Article 763 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825 stated: “[T]he use which the owner has
intentionally established on a particular part of his property in
favour [sic] of another part is equal to title, with respect to
perpetual and apparent servitudes thereon.”60 The 1808 Code
article was closer to that of the Napoleonic Code, providing: “The
intention of the father of the family is equal to title, with respect to
perpetual and apparent services.”61 The Legislature omitted the
word intentionally from article 767 in the 1870 Code.62 After the
1870 revision, the only mention of intent appeared in article 768.63
That article provided for a presumption of the common owner’s
intent.64 Article 768 read: “Such intention is never presumed till
[sic] it has been proved that both estates, now divided, belonged to
the same owner, and that it was by him that the things have been
placed in the situation from which the servitudes result.”65
Articles 767 and 768 of the Code of 1870 are both rooted in the
English translations of the Napoleonic Code.66 A comparison of
the English and French versions of the articles reveals that the
English versions were, in fact, mistranslations.67 The word intent
does not appear in either article of the Napoleonic Code.68 Article
692 of the Napoleonic Code stated: “Destination of the father of
the family is equal to title.”69 The English version of article 692
mistranslated this clause as, “The intention of the father of the
family is equal to title.”70 Similarly, the proper translation of the
French version of article 693 reads, “There is only destination of
the father of the family when it is proven,” but the English version
states, “The intention of the father of the family is never presumed
till [sic] it has been proved.”71 Accordingly, the word intent should
probably have never been included in Louisiana’s destination
regime because the French Code never provided for a presumption
of intent.
59. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 641.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 640–41.
67. See id.; see also C. CIV. arts. 692–693 (Fr.).
68. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640–41; see also C. CIV.
arts. 692–693 (Fr.).
69. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640; C. CIV. art. 692 (Fr.).
70. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640; C. CIV. art. 692 (Fr.).
71. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 641; C. CIV. art. 693 (Fr.).
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The mistranslated intent presumption of article 768 was not
included in current article 741.72 However, the omission was not
due to the mistranslation; the Louisiana Legislature chose not to
include the intent presumption “because it relates to matters of
proof.”73 The Legislature explained that “[i]t should be evident that
there is no destination under Article 741 unless there is proof that
the two estates belonged to the same owner and that it was he who
established the relationship giving rise to the servitude.”74 In a
1982 law review article regarding the revision, Professor
Yiannopoulos stated, “The intent to establish a destination is no
longer presumed; the court is free to draw the appropriate
inferences from proof that the two estates belonged in the past to
the same owner and that he erected the exterior signs of the
servitude.”75
After the Legislature chose to exclude the intent presumption
from article 741, there is no mention of intent in the Louisiana
Civil Code’s destination regime.76 It is unclear whether proof of
intent is still required, whether the question of intent was done
away with entirely, or whether intent should have ever been
mentioned in the Civil Code in the first place. Accordingly, it is
questionable whether the drafters of article 741 meant to allow
courts to inquire into the subjective intent of a party in a
destination case. The exclusion of article 768’s intent presumption
has proved troublesome in that it arguably created a vacuum that
allowed Louisiana courts to require plaintiffs to provide evidence
of intent.77
II. THE INTENT REQUIREMENT IN LOUISIANA
Despite article 741’s silence on the issue of the common
owner’s intent, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
requires evidence to that effect when a party claims destination.78
Recently, in Phipps v. Schupp, the Louisiana Supreme Court
implicitly adopted the intent requirement, although it questioned the

72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b (2011).
73. Id.; 1977 La. Acts 1335.
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b; 1977 La. Acts 1335.
75. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79 n.119.
76. LA CIV. CODE art. 741.
77. See discussion infra Part II.B.
78. See 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 596
So. 2d 836, 839–40 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992); Phipps v. Schupp, 19 So. 3d 38, 41
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2009), vacated, 45 So. 3d 593 (La. 2010).
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fourth circuit’s factual findings and reversed the decision.79 The
fourth circuit’s intent requirement is rooted in a familiar source.
A. The Fountainhead: Professor Yiannopoulos
Professor Yiannopoulos laid the groundwork for the fourth
circuit’s intent requirement in his article discussing the 1977 codal
revision.80 His article specifically focused on how the revision
affected the law regarding conventional predial servitudes created by
acquisitive prescription and destination.81 Professor Yiannopoulos
concluded that, aside from a few significant alterations, the law
remained essentially unchanged.82 He argued that the revised articles
continue to relate to older versions of the Louisiana Civil Code and
to the corresponding provisions of the French Civil Code.83
Therefore, “prior Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine, as well as
French jurisprudence and doctrine, continue to be relevant for the
interpretation and application of the new legislation.”84
In the section of his article discussing destination, Professor
Yiannopoulos wrote that the creation of such a servitude is based on
a “tacit agreement” theory.85 Adhering to French doctrinal authority,
Professor Yiannopoulos wrote that “[t]he law simply recognizes and
enforces this tacit agreement that is the equivalent of title.”86
Professor Yiannopoulos found that tacit agreement theory is based
on historical precedent and accounts for the French doctrinal and
jurisprudential interpretations of the French Civil Code articles on
destination.87
Professor Yiannopoulos wrote that, under article 741, in the
absence of a formal recordation of destination, an apparent predial
servitude is established by exterior signs on either the dominant or
servient estate.88 Although the Louisiana Legislature dropped the
79. Phipps v. Schupp, 45 So. 3d 593, 598–602 (La. 2010).
80. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 82. Yiannopoulos concluded that the biggest change in the law
was the abolishment of the distinction between continuous and discontinuous
servitudes. Id. at 83. This change enabled discontinuous servitudes, including
rights of passage, to be acquired by acquisitive prescription and by destination
of the owner. Id. Another important change in the law is that nonapparent
servitudes can now be acquired by destination of the owner if the common
owner files a declaration of destination. Id.
83. Id. at 82.
84. Id. at 82–83.
85. See id. at 74; see also discussion supra Part I.C.
86. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 74.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 78.
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express requirement of “an apparent sign of servitude” in the 1977
revision, there was no change in the law.89 Current Civil Code
article 741 clearly states that only an apparent predial servitude
“comes into existence of right” at the moment the two estates cease
to belong to the same owner.90 By definition, apparent predial
servitudes are evidenced by exterior works, signs, or constructions;91
therefore, according to Professor Yiannopoulos, the omission of the
“apparent sign of servitude” language was immaterial because the
redactors contemplated the same situation.92
However, Professor Yiannopoulos did not end his discussion
there. He stated:
According to French doctrine and jurisprudence that ought to
be pertinent for Louisiana, the exterior sign must be
characteristic of the particular kind of servitude that the
owner of the dominant estate claims and it must also be
indicative of the intent of the former owner to establish the
servitude.93
This sentence was of major importance to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal when it later applied the intent requirement.94 Although
Professor Yiannopoulos downplayed the significance of the
exclusion of former article 768’s intent presumption,95 the fourth
circuit appeared to take advantage of it.
B. The Application: Bienville
Ten years after Professor Yiannopoulos’s article, the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal accepted his theories in a seminal
destination case: 730 Bienville Partners v. First National Bank of
89. Id.
90. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011).
91. LA. CIV. CODE art. 707.
92. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79.
93. Id. Yiannopoulos elaborated further on what evidence of intent is
sufficient to trigger destination. Id. He stated that an exterior sign indicative of a
mere personal convenience to the owner does not create a predial servitude by
destination. Id. Yiannopoulos also asserted that personal action of the owner is not
always required for destination to apply; in some cases, the works may be made by
the owner’s agent or other representative. Id. According to Yiannopoulos, if the
common owner maintains these works, destination applies at separation of
ownership. Id. However, lessees, tenant farmers, and usufructuaries are not agents
and therefore cannot make works capable of becoming a predial servitude by
destination—even if the common owner maintains the works. Id.
94. See discussion infra Part II.B.
95. Professor Yiannopoulos relegated his comments on the deletion to a
footnote. Yiannopoulous, supra note 4, at 79 n.119.
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Commerce.96 Having been “free[d] to draw the appropriate
inferences”97 regarding the common owner’s intent, the court
declined to find such intent in Bienville.98 The facts of the case
occurred in the New Orleans French Quarter.99 The property in
question consisted of three contiguous tracts between Iberville and
Bienville streets—the St. Louis Hotel, Parcel K, and the Solari
parking garage.100

In 1980, Royal Bienville Investors, Ltd. (Royal)101 purchased
all three lots. Royal went bankrupt in 1986 and transferred its
ownership interest in the garage and Parcel K.102 However, Royal
retained its ownership interest in the hotel.103 Royal thereafter
leased spaces for hotel guests in the garage.104 First National Bank
of Commerce (First NBC) was granted a mortgage on the garage in
1990.105 Royal ultimately transferred its interest in the hotel to 730
Bienville Partners, Ltd. (730 Bienville)106 in 1990.107
The dispute arose in December 1990 when the hotel terminated
its parking agreement with the garage.108 Westminster Parking,
which operated the garage, then informed 730 Bienville of its
intent to close a doorway between Parcel K and the garage, thereby
96. Id.
97. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79 n.119.
98. Bienville, 596 So. 2d at 840.
99. See id. at 837.
100. Id. The diagram below appears in the original reported version of the
Bienville case.
101. Id. In 1984, Royal Bienville Investors transferred the three lots to Royal
St. Charles, Ltd., a separate partnership in commendam, in exchange for a 74%
limited partnership interest. Id. at 838. For purposes of simplicity, both business
entities will be referred to as “Royal.”
102. Id. at 838.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd., yet another partnership in commendam, was
the managing general partner of Royal St. Charles, Ltd. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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denying passage from the hotel through the garage to Iberville
Street.109 First NBC subsequently directed Westminster Parking to
block the doorway in early January.110
Next, 730 Bienville sued First NBC to prevent the doorway’s
closure.111 It argued that an apparent predial servitude of passage
via the doorway existed in favor of the hotel.112 The thrust of 730
Bienville’s claim was that the servitude was created by destination
in 1986 when the three lots ceased to belong to Royal alone.113 The
trial court disagreed.114 It ruled that no servitude was created by
destination because hotel employees had used the doorway
pursuant to a lease agreement and that the use of property pursuant
to a lease does not create a servitude.115 The fourth circuit affirmed
and held that 730 Bienville failed to prove that Royal intended to
establish a servitude of passage to and from Iberville street.116
The Fourth Circuit relied solely on Professor Yiannopoulos’s
article in its reasoning.117 First, the court agreed with Professor
Yiannopoulos that destination is based on tacit agreement theory.118
Second, the court, paraphrasing Professor Yiannopoulos, held that
“the common owner must intend to create an apparent servitude and
such intent must be evidenced by exterior signs which are consistent
with the nature and extent of the servitude claimed.”119 The
Bienville Court held that the exterior signs in the instant case were
not enough evidence to support Royal’s intent to use the garage as a
servitude of passage.120 According to the court, the only exterior
signs of a servitude of passage were located inside the garage, near
the door leading to Parcel K.121 In the court’s view, because 730
Bienville failed to prove the existence of exterior signs on Iberville
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The hotel would be the dominant estate and the garage the servient.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 840.
117. See id. at 839.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 840.
121. A survey taken at the time common ownership ceased had “Entry to
Hotel” written in the area of Parcel K. Id. at 839. The court held that this evidence
did not prove an intent to create a servitude to Iberville but merely showed that the
hotel could be entered from the garage. Id. Photos from the time common
ownership ceased showed a sign reading “The Saint Louis Hotel” above the
door inside the garage. Id. On the Parcel K side of the door, a sign read “To
Parking” and “Exit.” Id. The garage wall near the door was painted to match the
décor of the doorway. Id.
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Street directing foot traffic toward the hotel, 730 Bienville failed to
prove that Royal intended to create a passageway through the
garage.122 The court further reasoned that in order for hotel patrons
to use the doorway between the garage and Parcel K, they were
required to park their cars in the garage first.123 This condition,
according to the court, indicated that Royal did not intend that hotel
guests and employees would be able to use the garage as a pathway
to Iberville Street.124
C. The Acceptance: Phipps
The Bienville decision provided the basis for a similar result in
the recent Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal case of Phipps
v. Schupp.125 Again, the court held that destination did not apply
because the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of the
common owner’s intent to create a predial servitude.126 This time,
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court took up the intent issue and
reached the opposite conclusion from that of the lower courts.127
Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court employed the fourth
circuit’s intent requirement in its analysis, thereby implicitly
adopting the doctrine.
The Phipps dispute took place in the Uptown neighborhood of
New Orleans.128 Before 1978, the two estates at issue constituted only
one estate.129 Its boundaries consisted of Exposition Boulevard–
Audubon Park130 to the west, Patton Street to the north, and other
residential properties to the south and east.131 In 1978, the owner split
his lot into two separate properties: 541 and 543 Exposition
Boulevard.132 Lot 541 thereafter had no direct access to a usable
public road.133 In 1978, the owner sold 541, thereby enclosing the
122. Id. at 840.
123. Id. Interestingly, the court also examined evidence of the parking
arrangement after unity of ownership ceased. Id. at 839. In doing so, the court
appeared to miss 730 Bienville’s argument completely because a predial
servitude of destination is established at the moment of separation of ownership,
not afterwards. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011).
124. Bienville, 596 So. 2d at 839.
125. Phipps v. Schupp, 19 So. 3d 38 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2009), vacated, 45 So.
3d 593 (La. 2010).
126. Id. at 43.
127. See Phipps v. Schupp, 45 So. 3d 593 (La. 2010).
128. See id. at 595.
129. Id.
130. Exposition Boulevard is a walkway not designated for vehicular use. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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estate.134 Before the sale, the owner created a driveway running over
543 so that 541 would have access to Patton Street.135

541

543

Exposition Blvd.–
Audubon Park

Driveway

Other Residences

Other Residences

Patton Street
Plaintiff Roger Phipps bought 541 in 1982.136 He used the
driveway as a vehicular passageway for over 20 years.137 In 2003,
defendants Cynthia Schupp and Roland Cutrer, the owners of 543,
built a carport enclosure in their backyard that partially obstructed
the driveway so that vehicular passage to 541 became impossible.138
Phipps continued to use the unobstructed portion as a walkway to
and from Patton Street.139 In 2006, the defendants built a fence over
the unobstructed portion, thereby completely blocking off the
walkway.140
Perhaps having exhausted any attempts at neighborly
compromise, Phipps filed a possessory action seeking to have the
court recognize a right of passage and order the defendants to
remove their obstructions.141 Phipps argued that the presence of the
driveway when the common owner first sold 541 in 1978 gave rise
to a predial servitude by destination.142 The district court disagreed
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.143 The
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. The following diagram was created by the author of this Comment.
Id.
Id. at 595–96.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court relied on the “intent” language of Bienville and held that
Phipps had failed to demonstrate intent evidenced by exterior signs
because “[t]he mere existence and use of a concrete driveway does
not constitute a predial servitude.”144
On appeal, the fourth circuit extensively reviewed its reasoning
in Bienville and affirmed.145 The court concluded that historical use
of a particular pathway by the common owner cannot serve as
proof of intent; there must also be “exterior signs” demonstrating
the nature and extent of the servitude claimed.146 Furthermore, the
court held that existence of a contested pathway cannot alone serve
as proof of intent.147 Therefore, because Phipps could only point to
his own use of the driveway and its existence when the common
owner sold 541, the court found that his destination claim lacked
merit.148
Because the case was decided on summary judgment, Phipps
argued on appeal to the supreme court that material facts existed as
to the evidence of the common owner’s intention.149 The supreme
court agreed and remanded the case.150 The court distinguished
Bienville, reasoning that, in that case, “there were no exterior signs
indicating an existence of an apparent servitude.”151 All signs of a
servitude in Bienville were located inside the garage and therefore
were not “apparent” under the meaning of article 707.152 By
contrast, the court reasoned that the driveway in Phipps could
conceivably constitute a perceivable exterior sign under that
article.153 After all, according to the court, the driveway visibly
extended from Phipps’s garage through the defendants’
backyard.154
144. Id. It is unclear whether the district court meant to say an apparent
predial servitude.
145. Phipps v. Schupp, 19 So. 3d 38, 42–43 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2009), vacated,
45 So. 3d 593 (La. 2010).
146. Id. at 43.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Phipps v. Schupp, 45 So. 3d 593, 596–97 (La. 2010). Phipps’s alleged
facts were: (1) The driveway existed at the time 531 was sold; (2) there was no
express provision to the contrary for the use of the servitude; and (3) he had a key
to the driveway’s gate. Id.
150. Id. at 603. Somewhat surprisingly, the plaintiffs did not argue that a
legal servitude of passage was created when the estate became enclosed, which
would have done away with any destination claim. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 689–
695 (2011). The court supplied this argument on its own. Phipps, 45 So. 3d at
598.
151. Phipps, 45 So. 3d at 599–601.
152. Id. at 600; LA. CIV. CODE art. 707.
153. Phipps, 45 So. 3d at 600.
154. Id.
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Interestingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted specific
evidence for establishing the common owner’s intent in Phipps.
First, Phipps had a key to the driveway’s gate.155 The court
reasoned that if the key had been passed down from the common
owner, then the owner must have intended the driveway to serve
541.156 Secondly, the court stated that because the common owner
needed to get approval from the city planning commission to
subdivide his lots, he was required to abide by city planning
regulations that required all parcels of land in a subdivision to have
access to a public street.157 In the court’s view, because the
commission approved of the subdivision, the common owner must
have complied with the commission’s regulations.158 To the
Louisiana Supreme Court, this suggested that the common owner
must have intended 541 to have access to a public road.159
D. The Extension: Post-Phipps Application of the Intent
Requirement
Despite its disagreement with the fourth circuit’s findings in
Phipps, the supreme court did not do away with the intent
requirement—to the contrary, it implicitly adopted the doctrine.160
The court merely distinguished Bienville from Phipps; it did not
disagree with Bienville’s reasoning.161 Furthermore, the Phipps
court did not definitively resolve what exterior signs are sufficient to
prove intent but only suggested what may be sufficient.162 While the
court seemingly held that the existence of the driveway itself was an
exterior sign evidencing intent, in actuality the court merely stated
that this idea was “conceivable.”163 After Phipps, the definition of
“sufficient proof of intent” remains nebulous.
Not only is the intent requirement still a viable doctrine, it is
now the interpretation of Louisiana’s highest court. Therefore, lower
state courts will look to Phipps as a guide when considering a
destination case and will apply the intent requirement accordingly.
For the reasons discussed at length below, the supreme court’s
155. Id. at 601.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 601–02.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Cf. 1 PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 3:40,
at 127–28 (2d ed. 2011) (arguing that the supreme court, in Phipps, effectively
limited the “problematic” language of Bienville).
161. Phipps, 45 So. 3d at 599–601.
162. See id. at 598–603.
163. Id. at 600.
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adoption of the requirement will obfuscate lower courts’ analyses of
destination cases.164 The intent requirement should therefore be
abandoned in favor of a simpler, more objective standard in order to
lessen a court’s burden when faced with a destination issue.165
III. LE DÉBAT:166 THE VARIANCE OF FRENCH DOCTRINE ON
DESTINATION
In his article, Professor Yiannopoulos asserted that because
French doctrine and jurisprudence subscribe to the intent
requirement, Louisiana law should follow suit.167 Admittedly,
destination is a distinctly French civilian concept, and Louisiana’s
codal regime is inarguably based on that of the French.168
Professor Yiannopoulos is thus correct in stating that the French
“ought to be pertinent” in this area.169 By the same token, a review
of French doctrine reveals varying treatments of destination.170 If
Louisiana law is to base the intent requirement on the French, as
Professor Yiannopoulos argues,171 then that basis is questionable
when one considers their disparate approaches.
Professor Yiannopoulos’s argument that French doctrine
supports the intent requirement especially loses force when one
takes into account that he relied almost exclusively on Planiol.172
Several French commentators view destination quite differently
than Planiol does.173 Perhaps their analyses “ought to be
pertinent”174 as well. The following analysis of original French
164. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
165. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
166. “The Debate.”
167. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79.
168. See discussion supra Part II.C–D.
169. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79.
170. See discussion infra Part III.A–B; see also discussion supra Part I.C.
171. Yiannopulous, supra note 4, at 79.
172. It appears that Professor Yiannopoulos translated Planiol in his
description of the intent requirement. Compare Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 74–
75, with PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946. Professor Yiannopoulos
and Planiol also cite the same French jurisprudence. Compare Yiannopoulos,
supra note 4, at 79 nn.118–19, with PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 968, at
947–48.
173. Compare PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, §§ 966, 968, at 946–48
(asserting that the common owner must intend to create a servitude and that such
intent must be evidenced by exterior signs), with BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE &
CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 846 (arguing that the creation of predial
servitudes by destination of the owner is founded only on a “tacit convention”
between subsequent owners that the former owner’s state of affairs would remain
in place).
174. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79.
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sources illustrates that French doctrine is split on whether the
common owner’s intent has any relevance or whether destination is
based only on tacit agreement theory.
A. The “Intent Camp”
Some writers subscribe to the theory that, in order for destination
to apply, the apparent works must indicate that the common owner
had the will to establish a servitude.175 This “intent camp” believes
that the reason that the law recognizes destination is to respect the
common owner’s wishes.176 The most eminent of the “intent
scholars” is Planiol, as evidenced by Professor Yiannopoulos’s strong
reliance on Planiol’s explanation of destination.177 Other writers in the
intent camp include Pardessus, Toullier, and Henri Mazeaud.178
1. Planiol
Planiol begins his discussion of destination by defining it as “the
act by which a person establishes between two estates which belong
to him (or between two parts of a same estate) a situation which
would constitute a servitude if the estates belonged to two different
owners.”179 When the estates cease to belong to the same owner, the
servitude is “born” without title.180 Planiol then endorses tacit
agreement theory as the conceptual justification for why the law
grants the equivalent of title in these situations.181
However, Planiol goes on to state that tacit agreement theory
accounts for the jurisprudential requirement that the common owner
have the intention of establishing a servitude.182 According to
Planiol, there must exist on the dominant or servient estate an
“apparent state of fact clearly characteristic of the servitude claimed,
and revealing on the part of the common owner the will to establish,
in a definitive and permanent manner, the subjugation of one of his
estates to the other.”183 Works made for the personal convenience of
175. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–4.
176. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–4.
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178. See discussion infra Part III.A.2–4.
179. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 945–46.
180. Id. at 946.
181. Id. (“[Destination] is, in effect, founded on the supposition that there
was a tacit convention between the parties that the state of fact established by
the [common owner] would be maintained, and the law recognizes in this a
means of establishing the existence of an agreement.”).
182. Id.
183. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 968, at 947.
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the owner therefore are not indicative of such intent.184 The state of
fact must also exist at the moment of separation because the signs
must support the idea of a tacit convention between the parties that a
servitude exists.185
2. Pardessus
Pardessus stresses that permanent exterior signs of an apparent
servitude are determinative in destination cases.186 He writes that
“without such signs, one would not be able to infer a will to create a
true subjugation of one immovable to another.”187 In Pardessus’s
view, the exterior signs are the way to determine the common
owner’s will.188 However, Pardessus’s theory focuses more on the
signs of the servitude than on what the common owner was, in fact,
thinking.189 Although not expressly stating so, the important
determination under Pardessus’s theory is whether the parties
viewed the permanent signs as obviously indicative of an apparent
servitude. Thus, although Pardessus does speak of the common
owner’s intent, his theory is actually aimed at a determination of
whether the servitude was apparent to the parties.
3. Toullier
Toullier believes that “it is from [the] former condition [of the
estates], such as it existed while the two estates were in the same
hands, that destination results, because this condition manifests his
will.”190 He explains: “[O]ne perceives destination by the
disposition and arrangements that the owner made on his houses or
other estates, either for their utility, or to satisfy his fancy and
taste.”191 Toullier’s determination requires strong evidence of the
common owner’s actual intent—his “fancy and taste”—because his
theory focuses more on what the common owner was thinking than
the physical situation between the estates.192 Under Toullier’s
theory, the physical signs of the servitude do not bear on the state of
184. Id. at 948.
185. Id.
186. See 2 JEAN MARIE PARDESSUS, TRAITÉ DES SERVITUDES § 288, at 119
(8th ed. 1838).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 2 CHARLES BONAVENTURE, MARIE TOULLIER & J.B. DUVERGIER, LE
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 606, at 275 (6th ed. 1846).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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mind of the parties at separation of ownership but simply on what
the common owner desired to do on his property.193 Toullier thus
believes that the parties are not agreeing to continue the arrangement
between the estates but to honor the common owner’s intentions.194
4. H. Mazeaud
Henri Mazeaud’s theoretical basis for destination is similar to
Planiol’s but differs slightly.195 According to Mazeaud, the type of
works that a common owner has made on his estate is irrelevant.196
The works must only “materialize the intention to subjugate one
part of his estate to the profit of another.”197 Mazeaud believes that
the materialization of that intention gives rise to the idea of a tacit
agreement between the parties that the existing situation will be
become a predial servitude.198
Thus, Mazeaud’s explanation of destination does require an
element of the common owner’s intent, but it differs from Planiol’s
explanation because the works “materialize” the intention. The
important element of Mazeaud’s theory is not the common owner’s
intent but the works’ materialization of an intention. The word
materialize implies that the intention is obvious to the parties at the
moment that ownership is severed.199 Therefore, Mazeaud’s
“materialization” of intention is actually another way of saying that
the servitude is apparent.
B. The “Pure Tacit Agreement Camp”
French doctrine’s general acceptance of tacit agreement theory
likely results from a desire to conceptually justify destination as a
means of creating a conventional predial servitude. Under tacit
agreement theory, the implied agreement itself is considered the
title.200 The tacit agreement becomes the necessary “convention.”
Thus, tacit agreement conceptually explains how it is possible for

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 42, § 1721, at 408.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. This idea is similar to the “presumption” of intention under article 768
of the Louisiana Civil Code. See discussion supra Part I.D.
200. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946; Yiannopoulos,
supra note 4, at 74.
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destination to create a conventional predial servitude even though
there was no actual agreement between the parties.201
On the other hand, the theory that the common owner must
intend to create a servitude does not explain how destination creates
a conventional servitude despite the absence of an agreement.202 The
intent theory presupposes that a servitude was created by means of a
unilateral act—the will of the common owner.203 However, it is
conceptually impossible for a conventional servitude to be created
this way because the common owner cannot “agree” with himself to
create a conventional servitude.204 Therefore, destination cannot be
thought of as a continuation of the common owner’s will because
his will cannot create a servitude for the parties to continue.205
Tacit agreement theory solves this problem by granting an
implied title to the servitude at the moment that two people own the
estates.206 Several French writers strongly adhere to that theory’s
theoretical advantages and couch destination only in terms of a tacit
agreement.207 These writers in the “pure tacit agreement camp”—
including Laurent, Aubry and Rau, and Baudry-Lacantinerie—either
reject the idea of the common owner’s intent as irrelevant or neglect
to mention it at all.
1. Laurent
In Laurent’s view, destination is simply a manner of granting
title to a servitude by recognizing a tacit agreement between the
parties.208 Laurent states that “the servitude is born, not of the
exclusive will of the owner who destined one of his estates to the
service of the other, but of the combination of wills of those who
took part in the contract which operated to divide the estates.”209
Laurent views this explanation as especially reasonable in cases of
partition, where “the proprietor being dead, his will is for nothing in
establishing the servitude; it can only be shown by the destination to
which he gave the estates.”210
201. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2011). This provision is an application of the
Roman maxim nemini res sua servit (no one has a right of servitude in his own
property). Id. art. 646 cmt. f.
205. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
206. BAUDRY–LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
207. See discussion infra Part III.B.1–3.
208. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Thus, Laurent views destination only as a matter involving the
parties at severance of ownership. Laurent is correct that the
common owner’s will cannot be ascertained if he is dead, and,
therefore, only the exterior signs can indicate the existence of a
servitude. But the signs do not relate to the owner’s will—they
relate only to the tacit “combination of wills” of the parties at the
time that ownership of the estates is divided.211 Although especially
relevant in partition cases, Laurent’s “combination of wills” theory
is also useful for instances in which the common owner is a party to
the separation of ownership, such as when he sells part of his estate
to another. In such a case, according to Laurent, both parties’
intentions regarding the servitude should be inferred from the
situation existing at the time they contracted.212 For example, the
seller should not be able to claim later that he never intended to
create the servitude, thereby unilaterally depriving the buyer of its
use, when the signs clearly suggested otherwise. Laurent’s theory
avoids such inequitable results.
2. Aubry and Rau
Aubry and Rau support tacit agreement theory as the basis of
destination by implication.213 They make no mention of the
common owner’s will.214 Instead, they propose that one who
invokes destination must simply produce his title to the estate and
show that he is the successor of the person who created the
preexisting situation.215 Although not expressly rejecting the
jurisprudential intent requirement, Aubry and Rau’s neglect of the
subject is noteworthy.
Aubry and Rau’s explanation of destination truly follows the
letter of the law in that the French Civil Code articles on destination
provide for the exact same process.216 Under the French Civil Code,
the intent to create a servitude is implied when a party proves that
the two estates belonged at one time to the same person and that it
was that person who created the works.217 Louisiana Civil Code
article 741 produces the same result. The first paragraph of article
741 provides that destination can apply only when a single owner
establishes a relationship between two estates.218 The second
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
AUBRY & RAU, supra note 52, § 252, at 118.
Id.
Id. at 119.
C. CIV. arts. 692–694 (Fr.).
Id. art. 693.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011).
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paragraph of the article states that an apparent servitude is created
“at the moment the two estates cease to belong to the same
owner.”219 Therefore, if a party proves that a common owner created
the situation giving rise to an apparent servitude, and the party is the
common owner’s successor, then destination applies.
3. Baudry-Lacantinerie
Baudry-Lacantinerie is perhaps the strongest critic of a
unilateral intent element. In the section of his property treatise
covering destination, he writes:
This mode of establishing servitudes is not based on the
unilateral will of the owner of the two estates, on the sole
intention of the [owner] at the moment he created the state of
things which, later on, will be constitutive of the servitude;
the foundation of this mode is on a tacit agreement relative
to the maintenance of the state of things anterior to the
creation of the servitude, to the effect that the consensual
element only appears at the moment of division of the
estates.220
Thus, to Baudry-Lacantinerie, the common owner’s intent is
irrelevant. The determinative factor, according to BaudryLacantinerie, is whether the burden was apparent.221 Due to the
obvious burden on one of the estates, “the parties could not ignore
its existence” or consider it to be “precarious or transitory.”222
Baudry-Lacantinerie’s position is that if the parties said nothing
about the servitude, they obviously wanted to maintain the status
quo.223 Thus, Baudry-Lacantinerie focuses on the exterior signs
relation to the parties’ reasonable state of mind, and the common
owner’s intentions do not bear on his analysis at all.
However, Baudry-Lacantinerie does not completely disavow an
element of intent; he argues that “it is important to take into
consideration the intention of he who presided over the arrangement
when one wants to determine the extent of the servitude.”224
According to Baudry-Lacantinerie, the manner of use of a
destination servitude is governed “by the state of things from which
the servitude was born.”225 Such exercise is “restricted to the
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 1127, at 859.

874

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

advantages that the owner of the two estates had gotten out of the
state of things created or maintained by him.”226 To resolve a
dispute over the extent of a benefit to the dominant estate, “the state
of facts anterior to the birth of the servitude must be consulted, and
thus the intention of he who presided over the arrangement.”227 In
other words, the common owner’s intention is only relevant when
the parties disagree regarding the scope of the rights entailed within
the servitude.
For example, consider a modified version of the Phipps case.228
Assume that instead of a driveway, the common owner left in place
a narrow alley not meant for vehicular use. Assume further that
Phipps claimed that the existing walkway created a servitude of
passage which entitled him to expand the walkway’s use so he could
drive a vehicle over it. Under Baudry-Lacantinerie’s theory, Schupp
could successfully counter that the common owner never intended
the walkway to be used for vehicular passage because the exterior
signs clearly suggested pedestrian use. Under Baudry-Lacantinerie’s
theory, the common owner’s intent is certainly relevant in this
scenario because the issue is what kind of servitude was created. The
actual creation of the servitude, however, involves no inquiry into
the common owner’s intent.
C. Which Camp Should Courts Follow?
The differing approaches of the “intent camp” and the “pure
tacit agreement camp” illustrate that Professor Yiannopoulos was
one-sided in his reliance on the intent theory.229 French writers
approach destination using various theories and disagree as to
whether the common owner’s intent has any relevance. Therefore,
Professor Yiannopoulos’s intent requirement does not paint a
complete picture. Despite Professor Yiannopoulos’s invaluable
contributions to Louisiana law, courts should not feel bound to
inquire into the intent of the common owner simply because of his
position that the French espouse this idea. Louisiana courts ought to
take into account both the “intent camp” and the “pure tacit
agreement camp.”
Arguably, Professor Yiannopoulos may have pitched his tent
with the wrong camp. Professor Yiannopoulos relied heavily on
Planiol’s proposition that tacit agreement theory justifies an element

226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
See Yiannopoulous supra note 4, at 79.

2013]

COMMENT

875

of proof of the common owner’s intent.230 This proposition suffers
from serious conceptual flaws.231 Whereas tacit agreement theory
requires an objective, bilateral analysis of the reasonable beliefs of
both parties, the common owner’s intent requires a subjective,
unilateral analysis into his actions.232 As such, tacit agreement
theory and the intent requirement are conceptually incompatible.233
Furthermore, the cases Planiol cited in support of the intent
requirement are not helpful. Because Louisiana’s Civil Code articles
on destination are rooted in the Napoleonic Code, French
jurisprudence interpreting the French Civil Code’s destination
regime could be persuasive.234 Therefore, Professor Yiannopoulos
justifiably looked to those cases in his article.235 However, these
judgments provide no method for determining a common owner’s
subjective intent and rarely, if ever, provide any reasoning for the
introduction of a subjective element to destination issues.236
230. See note 172 and accompanying text.
231. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
232. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
233. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
234. See discussion supra Part I.D.
235. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79 n.118; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra
note 44, § 966, at 946 n.4.
236. Like their doctrinal brethren, French courts subscribe to tacit agreement
theory as the basis of destination. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Agen, Apr. 16, 1900, D.C. Jur., 1907, 2, 196 (Fr.) (“[A]t the moment of
separation of the estates, there is a tacit convention among the owners that the
state of things put in place by the owner will be maintained.”). The
jurisprudence has developed two necessary circumstances for destination to
apply: (1) the silence of the act of alienation; and (2) an apparent sign of
servitude existing at the moment of separation of estates. See, e.g., Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., July 9, 1867, S. Jur. I.
1867, 1, 323 (Fr.); Cass. req., Apr. 15, 1872, D.C. Jur. 1872, 1, 416 (Fr.); Cass.
req., Jun. 19, 1893, D.C. Jur. 1893, 1, 526 (Fr.).
One of the earliest reported cases held that apparent signs must also be of a
permanent and stable character. Cass. req., July 9, 1867, S. Jur. I. 1867, 1, 323
(Fr.). The court in this case found that tree branches hanging over an alleged
servient estate were not sufficiently “permanent” because they could be cut. Id.
According to this decision, even though the trees existed when the estates
belonged to the same owner, “[i]t was never the intention of the seller that the
trees remained always fixed.” Id. at 324. The court described the servient estate
owner’s tolerance of the branches as merely “good neighborly behavior.” Id.
Therefore, the court held that he did not tacitly agree to continue the servitude
when he did not cut the branches. Id. The court thus refused to acknowledge
destination. Id. at 325. This case is odd because it did not involve a common
owner’s works but merely the existence of trees overhanging a neighbor’s
property. The court expressly discussed that such a circumstance is not the same
as evidence of a common owner’s will. Id. It would appear, then, that this early
case was a poor starting point to determine what works are sufficient to evidence
intent.
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Although these judgments did focus on proving the intent of the
common owner, the issue was often whether the servitude was
merely personal in nature.237 The conceptual difficulties inherent in
Planiol’s intent requirement are not illuminated by French
jurisprudence. Accordingly, these judgments are of scant utility to
Louisiana courts and should be read with a wary eye.
As an alternative to Planiol, Louisiana courts might consider
Baudry-Lacantinerie’s sound theories regarding destination. His
theory avoids the theoretical complications posed by Planiol’s
introduction of a subjective intent element. Because a common
owner cannot create a conventional predial servitude by himself, a
tacit agreement between the parties to create the servitude is a
justifiable way to view destination.238 A tacit agreement can be
inferred when the exterior signs of a burden are of such a degree that
“the parties could not ignore its existence.”239 This inquiry involves
how the objective signs of a burden should have affected the parties’

Later, French courts decided destination cases with varying results. In one
case, the court found that apparent works were sufficient to manifest the
common owner’s intent to divert river water to a mill. Cass. req., Apr. 15, 1872,
D.C. Jur. 1872, 1, 416 (Fr.). That case involved a presumption of intent based on
relatively straightforward exterior signs—a manmade ditch leading from the
river to the mill. Id. Due to the obvious nature of a burden on the estate in that
case, the court found sufficient evidence of intent by deferring to the lower
court’s reasoning. Id. Other courts had more trouble accepting exterior signs as
evidence of intent. See, e.g., Cass. req., Jun. 19, 1893, D.C. Jur. 1893, 1, 526
(Fr.); Cass. 1e civ., May 8, 1895, S. Jur. I. 1895, 1, 272 (Fr.). For example, one
decision held that the existence of a water main left in place by the common
owner was not sufficient evidence of intent. Cass. req., Jun. 19, 1893, D.C. Jur.
1893, 1, 526 (Fr.). Because the court deferred to the finder of fact, the court did
not reach why the signs were insufficient, nor did it discuss the basis of the
decision. Id. Another case held that although there were exterior signs of a right
of passage between two estates, the works were made by a lessee. Cass. 1e civ.,
May 8, 1895, S. Jur. I. 1895, 1, 272 (Fr.). The court held that works made by a
lessee are not indicative of the common owner’s intent to create a servitude. Id.
237. Some of the cases deal only with the idea that the exterior signs must be
indicative of a benefit to the estate and not the owner. See, e.g., Cass. req., July
15, 1875, D.C. Jur. 1877, 1, 127 (Fr.); Cass. req., Mar. 7, 1876, D.C. Jur. 1878,
1, 69 (Fr.). The intent requirement in these cases is misapplied because, in each
one, the owner certainly intended to create a servitude, but the court found the
intent was to create a personal servitude. Cass. req., July 15, 1875, D.C. Jur.
1877, 1, 127 (Fr.); Cass. req., Mar. 7, 1876, D.C. Jur. 1878, 1, 69 (Fr.). The issue
in these cases was what kind of servitude was created, not the common owner’s
intent to create one. Cass. req., July 15, 1875, D.C. Jur. 1877, 1, 127 (Fr.); Cass.
req., Mar. 7, 1876, D.C. Jur. 1878, 1, 69 (Fr.).
238. See discussion supra Part III.B.
239. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
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reasonable state of mind and not how the signs evidence what the
common owner intended to do when he created the works.
Furthermore, Baudry-Lacantinerie is justified in his position that
intent is only relevant when the extent of a servitude is disputed.240
The use and extent of a predial servitude are governed by the title
that created it.241 In the case of destination, the law recognizes
destination as a title for conventional and apparent servitudes.242
This fictitious title can only be the situation existing at separation of
ownership because destination only arises in the absence of an
agreement.243 Therefore, the situation between the estates governs
the use and extent of the servitude. Because there is no written title,
the only way to determine the extent of a destination servitude is to
examine evidence of the benefit the common owner intended to
confer upon the dominant estate.244 Evidence of the common
owner’s intent is relevant in this scenario because it relates to what
the parties expected the situation to be. However, regarding the
creation of a servitude, the common owner’s intent is irrelevant
because that issue is confined to whether the parties believed a
burden existed on one of the estates.
The writers in the “pure tacit agreement camp”—especially
Baudry-Lacantinerie—provide other views on destination that
Professor Yiannopoulos perhaps should have considered. Their
explanations of destination are less conceptually troublesome than
those who subscribe to the idea that the common owner’s intent is
relevant. Louisiana courts ought to consider the advantages of taking
the pure tacit agreement approach.
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE “INTENT” IDEA
The intent requirement is now applied in Louisiana destination
law because of Professor Yiannopoulos’s adoption of the idea.245
The Bienville court, “free[d]” by Professor Yiannopoulos’s assertion
that “intent is no longer presumed,”246 explained destination as
follows:
A servitude that is created by destination of the owner is
based on the idea that when the owner of two estates
transfers one of them to another person, there is a tacit
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 697 (2011).
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 74.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 741.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1127, at 859.
See discussion supra Part II.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79 n.119.
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agreement between the parties that the existing relationship
between the estates will be maintained. Thus, the common
owner must intend to create an apparent servitude and such
intent must be evidenced by exterior signs which are
consistent with the nature and extent of the servitude
claimed.247
The intent requirement’s inherent theoretical difficulties are
readily apparent in the Bienville court’s statement. The second
sentence does not follow from the first. The parties, at separation
of ownership, cannot tacitly agree to continue a conventional
servitude that was never created in the first place.248 Tacit
agreement theory avoids this conundrum by implying a fictional
title to a conventional servitude.249 To inject an element of the
common owner’s subjective intent brings the conundrum back to
the forefront.
A. Conceptual Differences Between Intent and Tacit Agreement
“[A] tacit agreement between the parties” and the idea that “the
common owner must intend to create an apparent servitude” are
different concepts.250 Tacit agreement theory is an objective idea
that implies a bilateral agreement between the parties.251 On the
other hand, the intent requirement is a subjective idea that relates to
the common owner’s unilateral intentions.252
Tacit agreement theory essentially determines what the parties
should have subjectively believed based upon the objective exterior
signs of a burden on the servient estate.253 If a burden was
sufficiently apparent to the parties, the law implies a subjective
agreement between them that the burden will remain in effect.254
Because there is no actual agreement between the parties, the
objective exterior signs are the only way to determine what the
parties should have reasonably believed.255 In other words, the
subjective element of the tacit agreement can only be established
through objective means. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, a
247. 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 596 So.
2d 836, 839–40 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
248. See discussion supra Part III.B.
249. See discussion supra Part III.B.
250. Bienville, 596 So. 2d at 839–40.
251. See Hargrave, supra note 11, at 960.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
255. See id.; see also Hargrave, supra note 11, at 960.
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tacit agreement between the parties is an objective inquiry. The
question of the common owner’s intent is far more subjective.
Under the intent requirement, the exterior signs do not imply any
state of mind on the part of the common owner—they must prove
his actual, unilateral intent to create a servitude.256
B. Louisiana Should Take an Objective Approach
Louisiana courts should tackle destination issues objectively,
framed in terms of tacit agreement theory alone. Practically, this
approach makes more sense than requiring courts to probe the
common owner’s subjective intent. Louisiana Civil Code article 741
provides a simple, objective method for establishing a conventional
predial servitude despite the absence of an agreement between the
parties.257 When the exterior signs of a burden clearly suggest that
the parties cannot ignore its existence, article 741 is meant to supply
a fictional agreement between them.258 As explained by French
doctrine, tacit agreement theory is designed to supply the same
fictional agreement as a form of title.259 Thus, framing destination in
terms of the objective tacit agreement theory aids in the application
of article 741.
Conversely, the intent requirement frustrates the application of
article 741 because it may sometimes be difficult for the exterior
signs to prove what the common owner subjectively intended. For
example, consider a situation in which the common owner of a
large estate creates a charge in favor one portion of it, such as a
walkway to a back house. The owner then sells the entire estate to
someone else and moves away. The new owner decides to make
the walkway a driveway and improves it accordingly. The second
owner then dies, and the estate is partitioned. Many years later, a
dispute arises between the two new owners regarding the
driveway. If a court were required to probe into subjective intent, it
would be unclear whether the exterior signs should relate to the
intent of the original, common owner who created the walkway or
the intent of the subsequent common owner who improved it into a
driveway. Either way, a court may have a difficult time trying to
probe into the subjective state of mind of the absent original owner
or the long deceased second owner. However, if the court were to
apply article 741 objectively, the determination would simply be
whether the parties should have reasonably believed that the
256.
257.
258.
259.

Hargrave, supra note 11, at 960.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011).
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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driveway would remain there. An objective analysis of the exterior
signs would easily resolve this dispute.
As the foregoing example illustrates, an objective approach
would lessen Louisiana courts’ burden when deciding destination
cases. An objective approach is especially valuable in situations in
which the common owner is not a party, is absent, or is deceased.260
Determining whether the burden was apparent under the meaning of
article 707 would effectively resolve any destination dispute without
the parties having to prove what the common owner intended when
he created the situation at issue.261 The objective inquiry of whether
a party’s belief is reasonable based on exterior signs is relatively
simple to determine because it is grounded on tangible, empirical
evidence.262 Whether a belief is reasonable would depend on the
circumstances of each case, based on the exterior signs available to
the parties at the moment that common ownership ceased.263
For example, the Bienville and Phipps cases could have been
decided far more easily than they were.264 In Phipps, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reached the right result but for the wrong reason.
The court felt that the exterior signs were indicative of the common
owner’s subjective intent to create an apparent servitude.265 The
practical effect of Phipps is to put a greater burden of proof on the
party claiming destination. It naturally takes more evidence to prove
the common owner’s subjective intent than to prove a reasonable
inference of intent based on exterior signs. An objective application
of article 741 streamlines the determination of the issue. If the
Phipps court had applied article 741 objectively, there would have
been no question that an apparent servitude had come into existence
the moment that the estates were divided. The driveway itself should
have suggested to the parties that a servitude of passage would exist
between the estates.266 A waste of judicial resources, as well as
Phipps’s time and money, could have been avoided under a simple,
objective application of the article. Similarly, the Bienville court
would have been able to reach its correct conclusion but for the right
reason. Under an objective approach, the court could have
determined that the servitude was not apparent when Royal sold the
garage and dispensed with the destination argument easily.267
260. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
261. LA. CIV. CODE art. 707. Apparent servitudes by definition are evidenced
by exterior signs, works, or constructions. Id.
262. Hargrave, supra note 11, at 960.
263. Id.
264. See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
265. See discussion supra Part II.C.
266. Hargrave, supra note 11, at 960.
267. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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An objective approach to destination is also desirable from a
policy standpoint. Destination protects buyers’ reasonable
expectations as to what they are contracting for when they buy
property.268 When the contract of sale says nothing about an obvious
burden on one of the estates, destination protects a party who
reasonably expected the situation to remain in place. An objective
determination of whether the burden was apparent allows a party to
easily prove that its expectation regarding the servitude was
reasonable. On the other hand, the parties’ reasonable beliefs are not
protected when evidence of the common owner’s intent enters into
the equation.269 Most buyers probably do not expect to one day have
to litigate issues regarding what someone many years ago intended
to do on their property. It is unreasonable to expect them to do so.
CONCLUSION
The French institution of destination is an important part of
Louisiana civilian property law. If Louisiana courts were to consider
the various French doctrinal approaches to destination, it would
become clear that an objective approach is appropriate. Destination
is meant to imply a title to a conventional predial servitude despite
the absence of an agreement.270 Tacit agreement theory is a useful
theoretical device to aid in the interpretation of destination. Under
tacit agreement theory, the objective signs of a burden create the
fictional agreement between the parties. Tacit agreement theory thus
explains how a conventional predial servitude can be created
without an express “convention.”271 The soundest theoretical
explanation belongs to Baudry-Lacantinerie—if intent is relevant at
all, it only bears on the extent of the servitude.272 In other words,
intent should only be looked to when the physical manifestation of
the servitude creates an ambiguity as to the use for which the
servitude was meant.273
To avoid unjust results like the lower courts’ determination in
the Phipps case, courts should not look to evidence of the common
owner’s intent.274 When deciding a destination issue, a court would
268. See Catherine Mitchell, Leading a Life of Its Own? The Roles of
Reasonable Expectations in Contract Law, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 639, 648
(2003).
269. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.
270. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845.
271. See discussion supra Part III.B.
272. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1127, at
859; see also discussion supra Part III.C.
273. See discussion supra Part III.C.
274. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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do well to adhere to the old adage, the writing’s on the wall. In
terms of predial servitudes, the expression refers to obvious
evidence of a burden on the estate. When it comes to the fate of the
intent requirement, perhaps the writing’s on the wall as well.
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